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From Dissonance to Resonance:  
Cognitive Interdependence in Quantitative Finance 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract   This study explores the elusive social dimension of quantitative finance. 
We conducted three years of observations in the derivatives trading room of a major 
investment bank. We found that traders use models to translate stock prices into 
estimates of what their rivals think. Traders use these estimates to look out for 
possible errors in their own models. We found that this practice, reflexive modeling, 
enhances returns by turning prices into a vehicle for distributed cognition. But it 
also induces a dangerous form of cognitive interdependence: when enough traders 
overlook a key issue, their positions give misplaced reassurance to those traders that 
think similarly, disrupting their reflexive processes. In cases lacking diversity, 
dissonance thus gives way to resonance.  Our analysis demonstrates how practices 
born in caution can lead to overconfidence and collective failure. We contribute to 
economic sociology by developing a socio-technical account that grapples with the 
new forms of sociality introduced by financial models – dissembedded yet 
entangled; anonymous yet collective; impersonal yet, nevertheless, emphatically 
social.  
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From Dissonance to ResonanceThe Risk of Resonance:  
Cognitive Interdependence in Quantitative Finance 
  
As the term  “financial engineer” suggests, the recent history of finance is part 
of the broader rise in systems engineering over the last half of the 20th Century. 
Models, computers, and electronics have reshaped Wall Street as much as the jet 
engine changed aviation.  Whether in industrial engineering or in financial 
engineering, the new tools of practice have proven faster, bolder, and more complex, 
opening up the scope for gains in speed, efficiency, and power. But they have also 
opened up the possibility of disasters. Indeed, it is no coincidence that a new body of 
expertise, cybernetics, was developed to deal with the complexities of advanced 
technological systems in the age of machine intelligence. Writing in the aftermath of 
one of the most automated (and lethal) wars to date, Weiner (1948), McCulloch and 
Pitts (1943) and Von Foerster (1958) laid out the principles for the governance of 
systems marked by interdependencies and positive feedback. But whereas these 
concerns arguably helped system engineers limit (though not eliminate) the dangers of 
nuclear accidents or massive air traffic fatalities, the equivalent has not yet been 
developed for financial engineering. “Systemic risk,” “circuit breakers,” and related 
expressions populate the day-to-day parlance of regulators, but existing theories of the 
market do not explicitly focus on the interdependencies caused by financial modeling.  
Positive feedback, tight coupling, or lock-in hang menacingly over the portfolios of 
investors.  As the credit crisis of 2008 comes to show, the large technological systems 
at the core of the industrial economy may be better prepared for the risks of complex 
engineering than modern finance. 
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We explore the aforementioned risks to market stability by examining the 
social use of financial models. How are spreadsheets and equations deployed in banks 
and hedge funds? Do models replace, complement or fundamentally alter the ways in 
which traders rely on their judgment and social cues? What happens to a network 
when social interaction is mediated by an artifact such as a model? Following the 
methodology of the emerging literature in the social studies of finance (MacKenzie 
and Millo 2003; Knorr Cetina and Bruegger 2002; Beunza and Stark 2004; Preda 
2006) we conducted a three-year ethnographic study of the daily operations of the 
trading room of a major international investment bank, pseudonymous “International 
Securities.”  Our focus was its merger arbitrage desk, a team involved in a well-
publicized arbitrage disaster in 2001. In this study we combine the findings of our 
detailed ethnographic observations with a historical reconstruction of the arbitrage 
disaster in question. Merger arbitrage is a particularly appropriate setting because it is 
also free from the self-referential loops and “beauty contests” outlined by Keynes 
(1936), as merger completion is a decision taken by the companies with relative 
independence of the bets placed by the arbitrageurs (more on this below).  
Our findings point to the existence of a new socio-technical mechanism that 
results from the use of financial models. Arbitrageurs, we found, do not only use 
models to develop their own estimates of relevant variables. Crucially, they also 
deploy models to check their own estimates against those of their rivals. Thus, in place 
of models versus social cues, we observed traders modeling social cues. We refer to 
this practice as reflexive modeling. This procedure, known as “backing out,” among 
finance practitioners, is at the center of the use of models in quantitative finance and 
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was rated by Chester Spatt, recent Chief Economist at the Securities and Exchange 
Commission, as the second most important financial innovation of the past four 
decades, alongside with Black-Scholes (interview conducted by the authors). 
Reflexive modeling offers important benefit to individual funds. It gives 
individual participants a way to leverage the cognitive efforts of their rivals. In that 
sense, reflexive modeling suggests that the price mechanism is not only a device for 
aggregating disperse information, as Hayek (1945) famously put it, but that it can go 
much further and serve as a means for distributed cognition (Hutchins 1995). That is, a 
way that allows market participants to think collectively about the issue.  
Our study further demonstrates that these precautionary practices can also be 
dangerous. Reflexive modeling creates a form of cognitive interdependence that can 
amplify mistakes. When a sufficiently large number of arbitrageurs overlook a critical 
factor driving merger failure, the dissonance that is at the core of reflexive modeling 
turns to resonance.  It is this resonance that creates misplaced confidence, leading to 
widespread and oversized losses. The occurrence of such losses has been well 
documented in the academic finance literature, and is referred to as “arbitrage 
disasters” (Officer 2007). An arbitrage disaster is specific to merger arbitrage, as is 
defined as “deal failures that cause merger arbitrageurs worst-loss day exceeding $500 
million” Officer (1997:12).  
Our analysis contributes to economic sociology by outlining the contours of the 
new sociability ushered in by quantitative finance. As repeatedly described by scholars 
of finance (e.g., MacKenzie 2006; Knorr-Cetina 2005), the introduction of financial 
models and electronic markets has been described as a replacement of personal 
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networks with anonymous transactions, and social capital with human capital. 
However, the existence of reflexive model demonstrates that quantitative traders have 
not actually replaced social cues with financial models.  Instead, traders use models as 
an instrument to observe and measure social cues. As a result, the dysfunctions of an 
overembedded financial market –herding, self-fulfilling prophecies-- are now less 
prominent. But new risks such as resonance have developed in their place.  
 
UNDERSTANDING INTERDEPENDENCE IN QUANTITATIVE FINANCE 
How is quantitative finance a social endeavor? The current debate has emphasized 
either the social or the technical aspects of the capital markets, but failed to take 
both simultaneously into consideration. Our review below examines the various 
approaches to “the social” in behavioral finance, economic sociology, and science 
and technology studies. The conclusion emerging from it is that grappling with 
modern markets calls for an understanding of the novel forms of economic 
engagement introduced by financial models. We characterize this as a form of 
cognitive interdependence, created by the distributed cognition that is afforded by 
financial models.    
Behavioral finance and the need for a socio-technical account 
 The challenges involved in characterizing quantitative finance are aptly 
illustrated by the limitations of existing behavioral approaches to risk. These 
shortcomings are clear in “Black Swan” accounts that attribute financial crises to 
the overuse of financial models. Building on the Knightian distinction between risk 
and uncertainty, several authors have argued that crises occur when the 
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unquestioned use of financial models leads banks to underestimate uncertainty 
(Taleb 2007; Derman 2004; Bookstaber 2007).  The models used by these investors, 
the argument goes, assume a future that is an extrapolation of the past. Investors 
assume, for instance, that stock returns follow a Normal distribution. However, 
financial markets are subject to unpredictable extreme events, or Black Swans. 
Instead of a Normal distribution, stock returns are more accurately described by fat-
tailed distributions, and to the extent that investors do not incorporate these 
exceptions into their models, their trading will be subject to the risk of disaster.  
Although appealing, the Black Swan is ultimately an under-socialized explanation 
of the risks created by models. The Black Swan presents financial actors as 
hopelessly unreflexive about the limitations of their models. Confronted by 
uncertainty about the model, we would expect market actors to rely on the social 
cues around them – which brings us back to the question of how actors combine the 
social and the technological.   
 In contrast to this, another stream of behavioral literature has pointed to 
dynamics of imitation among financial actors (Scharfstein and Stein 1990; see also 
Banerjee 1992; Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer and Welch 1992 on information cascades). 
In the seminal account by Scharfstein and Stein (1990) herding takes place when 
actors have an incentive to mimic the actions of others, even if their private knowledge 
would dictate doing otherwise. This typically takes place in situations that couple 
uncertainty with an overly comparative reward structure. Consider, for example, two 
salespeople who are to choose whether to sell wine in the East or West end of a city.  
There is uncertainty as to how much demand there is in both ends, and each of them 
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has some private information about it.  If the salespeople are paid a straight 
commission on their sales, each of them will choose whichever side of town they think 
will have greater demand. Consider now what happens if they are paid a comparative 
scheme, in which agent one chooses first and agent two’s bonus is based on how much 
she sells over or below agent one. If that is the case, it will be in the best interest of 
agent two to simply follow salesman one’s decision, even if her private information 
suggests that demand is greater on the other side of town. Doing so avoids the worst 
possible outcome, namely, one in which the first agent is lucky and the second one is 
not. As Keynes puts it, “wordly wisdom teaches that it is better for reputation to fail 
conventionally than to fail unconventionally” (Keynes 1936: 158). A related model of 
imitation is given by studies of information cascades (Banerjee 1992; Bikhchandani, 
Hirshleifer and Welch 1992).  
Cascades and herding, however, do not account for the existence of technology 
in the decision-making process. In the classic account of herding and cascades, actors 
do not change their opinion but simply disregard it for the sake of conforming to the 
actions of others. Beliefs are replaced rather than combined, with actors 
metaphorically disconnecting their brains to act according to the dictates of the mass. 
Admittedly, this might have been a realistic portrayal of financial actors before the 
1980s, when decision-making was primarily embedded and institutionalized (Abolafia 
1988; Baker 1984). But the introduction of computers, equations and models into 
financial markets during the past three decades has also changed the attitudes and 
procedures in the trading rooms (MacKenzie and Millo 2003; Beunza and Stark 2004).  
For instance, trading with a model is not the same as trading without one: it entails 
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handling and manipulating a body of codified knowledge that cannot simply be put to 
the side for the sake of copying someone else’s decision – at least, not without 
fundamentally abandoning the trading strategy.   
Economic sociology and the problem of anonymity 
 The dominant paradigm in economic sociology is equally unprepared to 
grapple with the technological aspect of quantitative finance. Economic sociologists 
have traditionally presented market activity as social by emphasizing that 
transactions are embedded in social ties (Granovetter 1985, Baker 1984). But the 
notion of embeddedness --developed before the full impact of the quantitative 
revolution on Wall Street-- needs to be reconsidered in settings where networks of 
people have been augmented by socio-technical networks, including connections, 
computers and financial models.  Whereas embeddedness presupposes the existence 
of personal acquaintance among social actors, current financial markets are in some 
ways shaped by deliberate anonymity. What, then, is the counterpart of 
embeddedness when the only actor that a trader sees is through a screen? 
Beyond embeddedness, the social can also be construed as a process of 
institutionalized belief formation. In this sense, the sociological notion of self-
fulfilling prophecy offers a crucial analytical first step. As Robert K. Merton (1968) 
observed in his analysis of a run on a bank, economic activity can be social despite 
being anonymous. Banking, according to Merton, is a special form of activity in 
that it is subject to positive feedback between beliefs and behavior – that is, to self-
fulfilling prophecies. Because a depositor’s decision to draw out his or her funds 
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reduces the liquidity available to other depositors, the collective perceptions of a 
bank’s solvency among its different depositors end up sealing the fate of the bank.  
 Merton’s account, however, needs to be reformulated to fit a modern context 
of models and financial technology. In the standard Mertonian setup, self-fulfilling 
prophecies entail an over-abstracted, almost tautological portrait of how crises 
happen. If a sufficiently large number of depositors fear a crisis, the run on the bank 
will surely happen. But as Callon (2007) asks, how do these beliefs arise in the first 
place? One answer might be that these beliefs are a shared convention. But this 
poses the additional question of how depositors coordinate their views around a 
given convention in the first place.  
The answer, Callon suggests, points to the material basis of belief formation. 
For instance, a line forming outside a retail bank branch can be enough to prompt 
fears of a bank run, but the line itself is manifestly material – a systematic 
formation of human bodies, positioned on the sidewalk of the street and in full 
display for the rest of the city. In more advanced forms of financial activity, 
financial models could be one such form of belief coordination. In this respect, the 
application to markets of the analytic tools of Science and Technology Studies 
(STS) offers useful guidance. To understand anonymous transactions, argue Callon 
and his colleagues,1 we must analyze the materiality of calculation, including 
financial models (Callon 1998, 2007a). Models frame decisions and quantify 
alternatives, thereby exerting a mediating role on financial valuation.  
                                                 
1 See also Callon 1998, 2007; MacKenzie and Millo 2003; Mackenzie 2006; for reviews,see 
Fligstein and Dauter 2007; Healy and Fourcade 2007; Ferraro, Sutton and Pfeffer 2005. A related 
stream of work (Dodd 2011) has examined the sociology of money, especially in the context of the 
quantitative revolution and more recent rise of credit derivatives. 
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Technology and cognitive interdependence 
Callon’s work has thus focused the debate on the problem of calculation. As 
he demonstrated, allowing for the role of technology in economic decision-making 
calls for accepting that market devices can afford actors the type of quantitative 
engagement that economists posit in their models. Callon’s (1998) early emphasis 
on materiality focused on the tools. Callon attributed an actor’s ability to calculate 
to the separation (“disentanglement”) between the transacting parties and the 
economic object being exchanged. This had the advantage of explaining how actors 
are able to calculate with complete independence from each other: the device 
replaces social cues. But it also failed to provide a theory of market actors might 
rely on each other-- as it focused on actors acting in complete independence.  
In subsequent work, Callon has outlined the ways in which the social and 
material come together. Callon (2008) argues that decision-making is not purely 
driven by the calculative device but also by interaction with other actors in a 
heterogeneous network of humans, tools and other elements. Thus for instance, 
supermarkets offer a calculative device of sorts –a shopping cart, which allows 
consumers to ascertain the physical volume taken up by their purchases. But 
equipped with a mobile phone, shoppers can also include in their calculations the 
judgment of others in their personal network. This entails a critical move away from 
a tool-centered (in his language: “prosthetic”) view of decision-making, and 
towards one in which the actor is supported (“habilitated”) by a network of people 
and things. Callon refers to this new perspective on market actors as “homo 
economicus 2.0.” Extending Callon’s new approach of mixing the social and the 
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material to the case of financial markets, we ask: What happens when traders use 
devices that bring other traders’ opinions to bear on their calculations?  We then go 
on to explore a further question: Once social dynamics are introduced in calculative 
decision-making, do the dysfunctions of society then also enter into the 
calculations.  
 In attempting this redefinition of “the social,” we draw on Knorr-Cetina’s 
(2005) notion of scopes, or observational instruments. Knorr-Cetina draws a 
distinction between network-centered and scope-centered markets. In the former, 
personal relations carry the burden of coordination (“network architectures”). In the 
latter, objects are the central coordinating device. The actions of investors are 
projected onto a scope, creating a representation that investors can react to. Their 
reactions, in turn, become part of this representation. Investors do not react to each 
other, but to the aggregate traces of each other’s actions -- as seen on the scope. 
Such new rules of association – aggregation, anonymity, and mediation through 
shared representation – offer fertile grounds to theorize the ways in which risk can 
originate in financial models. But the full benefits of scoping only accrue to those 
traders that combine the market device with a body of codified knowledge (i.e., a 
model) that turn this new representations into an input for decision making that non-
quantitative rivals do not have at their disposal. 
This is, in many ways, the context explored by Beunza and Stark (2004) in 
their ethnography of a derivatives trading room. Their study begins to explore the 
distinct organizational properties of quantitative finance. Thanks to models, 
databases and electronic data, arbitrageurs can see opportunities that they otherwise 
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would not be able to detect. The traders’ reliance on such specialized instruments, 
however, entails a serious risk: in bringing some information into sharp attention, 
the software and the graphic representations on their screens also obscure other 
equally important information. Beunza and Stark (2004) analyze the organizational 
mechanism that traders deploy to minimize this risk. Each desk in the trading room 
had developed its own way of looking at the market; by clustering all the desks in 
the same open-plan space --and especially by putting in place integrative 
organizational policies that ensure the flow of knowledge across desks—the traders 
improved their understanding of the limits of their models. But while successful at 
analyzing both the organizational and technical aspects of the market, Beunza and 
Stark (2004) paint a seemingly autarkic bank, where social interaction only took 
place among colleagues inside the room. Nowhere in their account is there an 
examination of inter-organizational networks, interactions in bars and restaurants, 
or of the role of geographical proximity on Wall Street.  
 In offering a theoretical account of the new sociality of quantitative finance, 
we also draw on MacKenzie and Millo’s (2003) work on performativity and the 
Black-Scholes formula for options pricing (see also MacKenzie 2006, and Millo 
and Mackenzie 2008). Although not explicitly theorized as such, MacKenzie and 
Millo (2003) offer a theory of cognitive interdependence based on a model. In their 
account, options traders used the Black-Scholes formula backwards to translate 
option prices into a measure of the “implied volatility” of a financial option. A 
measure, that is, of the estimates of future volatility made by rival traders. The 
transformation of the formula into an observation instrument gives rise to cognitive 
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interdependence, as it lets some actors use the actions of others as inputs into their 
own decision-making. However, MacKenzie and Millo (2003) do not take the extra 
step of exploring the implications of this setup for the new risks posed by 
quantitative finance.  
Neither do the authors explore this dynamic in subsequent work. For 
instance, MacKenzie’s (2006) analysis of Long Term Capital’s debacle in 1998 
turns to a traditional conceptualization of “the social,” in the form of imitation 
following personal ties. Specifically, he explains the social dimension of the 1998 
crisis as the result of “consensus trades,” that is, institutionalized trading strategies 
that arose from social interaction among investors. Yet financial models, we 
contend, create a distinct form of interdependence that needs to be understood in its 
own terms. Once traders rely on anonymous competitors for crucial insight, a novel 
mechanism of social influence has been created. What potential pitfalls does it 
pose?  
By contrast, MacKenzie’s (2010a) analysis of the 2008 credit crisis is more 
in line with our socio-technical perspective. In it, MacKenzie focuses on the 
organizational aspect of valuation.  The reckless mortgage lending that 
characterized the credit crisis, he argues, can be partly attributed to the lack of 
integration within rating agencies. Mortgage traders, traditionally specialized in 
asset-backed securities, drew on different knowledge sets, tools and techniques than 
those used by derivatives traders, traditionally specialized in collateralized debt 
obligations. The rise of mortgage-based derivatives, which combined the two 
spheres of activity, called for an integration of these two evaluation practices. But 
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they were kept separate in the rating agencies, opening the door to questionable 
valuations. MacKenzie’s (2010a) study is thus exemplary in demonstrating that a 
faulty organization of modeling constitutes a pitfall in quantitative finance. It also 
illustrates the dangers of ignoring the integrative bank management policies 
outlined by Beunza and Stark (2004). However, MacKenzie’s article says little 
about the interplay between models and sociality outside the organization.  It is to 
this problem that we turn in our study.  
RESEARCH METHODS 
Research site. The data reported below are taken from our observations of the merger 
arbitrage desk at pseudonymous International Securities, a global bank with an active 
proprietary trading unit. The bank was among the world’s ten largest in equity 
underwriting (Hoffman 2006). Our observations center on its equity derivatives 
trading room, located in Lower Manhattan. Proprietary trading units of this kind 
function as internal hedge funds within an investment bank, that is, they trade with the 
bank’s capital rather than the client’s, making their activity potentially riskier but also 
more lucrative.  
Arbitrage constitutes an ideal site to examine models and their risks because 
arbitrage played a central role in many recent financial crises.  These include the 
market crash of 1987, the crisis of Long Term Capital in 1998, and the hedge fund 
“mini-crash” of August 2007 (see respectively Dunbar 2000; MacKenzie and Millo 
2003; Lowenstein 2000; Jorion 2004; MacKenzie 2006; Khandani and Lo 2007).  Of 
the different trading strategies pursued by arbitrageurs, our study centers on merger 
arbitrage. This focus on mergers allows us to identify financial failure, as it allows us 
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to separate the perceptions of financial actors on Wall Street from the actual events 
that unfold outside it.  
Unlike other arbitrage strategies such as convergence trades, merger arbitrage 
is an “event-driven” strategy. It boils down to informed speculation about a specific 
event – the completion of a corporate merger. The implication is that our traders are 
not simply monitoring the positions of others in order to anticipate “where the crowd 
is moving.” Rather, they do so to derive the expectations of other traders about the 
likelihood of an event – the merger – that will, in the end, happen or not happen. And 
that event, the merger, is by and large independent of the collective wagers of the 
arbitrage community (although there is debate on this point – see Larcker and Lys 
1987; Corelli and Li 2002; Hsieh and Walkling 2005). Thus, the specific form of 
specularity involved in merger arbitrage differs from Keynes (1936) view of financial 
markets as beauty pageants (see Dupuy 1989) in that arbitrageurs can collectively be 
wrong. This makes merger arbitrage ideal to understand financial crises.  
 We explore the role of models in merger arbitrage with a combination of 
ethnography and historical sociology. Our ethnography entailed a three-year 
engagement with the bank, extending to more than sixty visits between the Fall 1999 
and the Spring of 2003. We complement our observations with a historical 
reconstruction of an arbitrage trade that ended up in disaster. On June 2001, a decision 
by the European Commission led to the forced cancellation of the GE-Honeywell 
merger, imposing losses of $2.9 billion on the merger arbitrage community. 
International Securities was involved in this trade, and lost six million in it. Using 
interviews and other historical data, we reconstruct what happened with this trade in 
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light of the mechanism that we identified during our ethnographic observation.  
Our combination of ethnography and historical sociology offers a powerful 
probe. Ethnography is particularly useful to understand the complexities of financial 
modeling, for it places the researcher in the same uncertainty about the future as his or 
her subjects experience, thereby avoiding the danger of retrospectively 
underestimating uncertainty (Orlikowsky 1992; Barley 1986; Agar 1986; Spradley 
1979). Partly for that reason, ethnography has been a method of choice in the social 
studies of finance literature (Abolafia 1996; Knorr-Cetina and Bruegger 2002; Zaloom 
2003; Beunza and Stark 2004). 
Our study combines ethnography observation with historical sociology. The 
examination of GE-Honeywell allows us to focus on a specific instance where merger 
arbitrage became problematic and potentially disastrous. Admittedly, we were not 
physically in the trading room while the GE-Honeywell merger unraveled – hence our 
treatment of it as historical sociology. But our ethnography provided us with access to 
the key traders who suffered the losses, as well as unique interpretation of the event 
based on the socio-technical dynamics that we did observe first-hand. Just as Vaughan 
(1996) was able to effectively reconstruct the Challenger disaster without being 
present at Cape Kennedy on the day of the accident, our research design did not find 
us on the trading floor on the very day of the arbitrage disaster -- but we were there on 
multiple other occasions, both before and after.  
Our mixed methods approach offers an important advantage. By providing a 
symmetrical treatment of success and failure, our study avoids the trappings of the 
sociology of error (Bloor 1976), in which “the social” is only seen as the source of 
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dysfunctional behavior. Thus, whereas models of herding and information cascades 
only consider the negative aspects of social interaction, our study explains disasters in 
the same way that it explains extraordinary success.  
 
REFLEXIVE MODELING AT A MERGER ARBITRAGE DESK 
Our study of modeling at a merger arbitrage desk was part of a broader ethnographic 
study of a derivatives trading floor on a Wall Street investment bank. Following the 
downfall of Long Term Capital in 1998, the over-arching goal of the study was to 
characterize quantitative finance in its various aspects: organizational, cultural, and 
economic. What were the distinct challenges of managing derivative traders? How was 
the profession experienced by its practitioners? What was the rationale for the outsized 
returns (and bonuses) enjoyed by them?  
We started the project by focusing on the manager of the trading room. We 
soon learnt that that social interaction in the trading room was very different from 
traditional open outcry in financial exchanges: information technology and modern 
trading (arbitrage) had transformed trading rooms into more silent and intellectual 
spaces. We continued by seeking to understand arbitrage, interviewing the heads of 
various desks that comprised the trading floor – merger arbitrage, options arbitrage, 
index arbitrage, etc. We soon realized that we would only be able to understand 
quantitative techniques by engaging in detailed observation at one desk. We chose the 
merger arbitrage desk for three reasons. First, it employed a distinctly quantitative 
strategy (post-announcement trading) that was considerably evolved from the over-
socialized practices of insider trading that brought down Ivan Boesky in the 1980s. 
Second, the merger desk was one of the most respected and profitable ones in the 
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trading room. And third, the head of the merger desk was regarded as a world-class 
expert the industry. In the following account we report our findings from data gathered 
on the morning of detailed observation of merger arbitrage, March 27th, 2003. But the 
analysis of these data draws on observations from all three years of fieldwork. 
Setting up the trade 
Our morning of observation started at 9:00 am on March 27, 2003, minutes 
before the US markets opened. We found the arbitrageurs sitting at the merger desk, 
working quietly at their computers. Oswald, the junior analyst among the three, was 
absorbed in a succession of PowerPoint slides on his screen, isolated from the others 
by a pair of headphones. Max and Anthony, senior and junior traders respectively, 
were entering data from a sheet of paper into Excel spreadsheets. They worked in 
parallel to prevent clerical mistakes. As they typed, their conversation turned to data 
about other ongoing trades. “What’s your price for Whitman?” asked one of them. 
“I’ve got bad data on it.”  
 An important merger had just been announced.  Career Education Corporation, 
a private provider of vocational training based in Illinois, had stated its intention to 
acquire Whitman Education Group, a Miami-based competitor.  The news had landed 
on the Bloomberg terminals of the traders at 5:58 pm of the previous day, with the 
market already closed.  The arbitrageurs confronted the news on the following 
morning, minutes before our visit.  
 The traders were reacting to the merger announcement in their characteristic 
way, preparing a trade.  The first step in this process was the elaboration of a 
memorandum.  The memo summarized the key details of the Whitman-Career 
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combination. Oswald compiled the memo after listening to the presentation that the 
merging companies put out for analysts; hence his headphones.  The output of his 
work was a document stating the legal details of the merger: the cash and stock that 
Career would pay for Whitman, the expected closing date, etc.   
  Preparing the trade entailed a further step.  The traders proceeded by codifying 
the document into an Excel spreadsheet, known as the “Trading Summary.” This 
functioned as a brief of all the trades in which the desk was involved. On the morning 
of May 27th the traders were active in 31 deals, so the involvement in Career-Whitman 
meant the addition of a 32nd row to the document. On the rightmost column of the 
Trading Summary, single words such as  “Judge”, “Chinese,” “Justice approves,” or 
“watch,” remind traders of the key aspect of the deal that they need to follow. Like the 
instrumentation panel of an aircraft, the Trading Summary made all financial action 
readily visible at a glance.  
 These early observations underscore the importance of quantitative 
infrastructure in modern finance.  A merger trade requires the assembly of electronic 
scaffolding to supplement the arbitrageurs’ mental processes: a PowerPoint 
presentation, followed by a Word memorandum, followed by an Excel spreadsheet, all 
of it condensed into a single live cell on a Trading Summary.  In short, cognition is 
distributed at the merger arbitrage desk. Like the pilots and ship crew studied by 
Hutchins and colleagues (Hutchins and Klausen 1996; Hutchins 1995), arbitrageurs 
can reduce their cognitive overload – the extent of their bounded rationality – by 
turning to the machines and instruments around them. Arbitrageurs are aware and 
understand this process, and refer to it as “setting up” the trade.  
Formatted: Highlight
 20 
 This first vignette also points to an important cultural trait at the merger 
arbitrage desk.  The arbitrageurs, and Max especially, were keenly aware of the 
disastrous potential of mistake, hence the routine of entering data in parallel.  More 
generally, Max illustrates the cultural transformation on Wall Street induced by the 
introduction of models and information technology: an appreciation for factual 
accuracy, and accompanying attitude of scientific detachment. For example, on 
hearing us use the term “buy a stock,” Max winced and corrected us.  He remarked: 
We don’t say that.  The most obvious thing that differentiates the professional 
from the amateur is that you talk about how you are positioned towards the 
stock--you are short or long.  But you don’t ‘own it,’ with the commitment that 
it implies.  It is much more dispassionate, professional, even-handed.   
 
In other words, Max practices a distant form of economic engagement, and deems it a 
mark of professionalism.  
 A related trait of Max is his resolute drive to arrive at solutions on his own.  
This manifested itself, for instance, as conflict with the manager of the trading room 
over the location of the merger desk. Aware of the possibility for synergy across 
trading desks, the manager rotated the position of some desks within the room, and 
encouraged communication between people.  But this clashed with Max’s penchant for 
arriving to solutions on his own, especially when the manager proposed locating the 
merger traders near the sales desk.  As the manager said, 
Max did not want to be near the sales force, guys who are trying to sell merger 
trades to the clients, yakking away it’s gonna happen, it’s gonna happen. He 
did not want that to influence him. 
 
Max, we conclude, does not have the habitus of a trader inclined to follow the herd. 
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Taking a position  
Amidst the hubbub of the data entry, the arbitrageurs sized up the nature of 
the newly announced merger. Categories, analogies, and other references to the past 
allowed them to engage in pattern recognition that would lead them to take a 
position. At 9:40 am, for instance, Max and Oswald engaged in a dialogue about 
Whitman and Career.  “Do they have regulatory approval?” asked Max, without 
taking his eyes off the screen.  “They do,” Oswald replied, looking at his 
spreadsheet.  “Do they have accreditation?” Max inquired.  “What schools are 
these, anyways?” Max added emphatically, his eyes squinting at his screen.  
“Technical, for adults” Oswald responded.  “They teach you things such as how to 
be dentist assistant,” he added.    
 The conversation was an effective first step in sizing up the probability of 
merger completion. This probability is the figure that arbitrageurs care about most. 
The basic principle of modern arbitrage is to exploit mispricings across markets. These 
situations arise when two different regimes of value coexist in ambiguity (Beunza and 
Stark 2004), and merger arbitrage is no exception. In the case of mergers, the 
ambiguity arises from the fact that a company is being bought.  The acquiring firm 
typically buys the target company at a price well above its market capitalization, 
leading to two possible valuations: if the merger is completed, the price of the 
company will rise up to its merger value; if it is not, the price will drop back to the 
level before the merger announcement or lower. Arbitrageurs exploit the ambiguity as 
to which of the two will apply by speculating on the probability of merger completion. 
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To the arbitrageurs, therefore, profiting from mergers boils down to successfully 
estimating a probability.    
 In their exchange, Max and Oswald established a set of facts that subsequently 
proved relevant to establish this probability. For instance, they established that the 
merged company, if completed, would belong to the “for-profit post-secondary 
education sector.”  The usefulness of this categorization became clear at 9:45 am, as 
Max turned to examine a chart of Whitman’s sales.  “Is it true that there’s a summer 
drop-off in this business?” he asked Oswald, faced with what appeared to be weak 
summer sales.  This mattered, because a common source of merger failure is negative 
results at one of the merging companies.  But there was no reason to worry. “It’s the 
summer recess,” Oswald replied. The weakness in sales was due to the school holidays 
– a normal part of the education industry. Because the companies belonged to the 
education industry, the cyclical drop-offs in sales were not a relevant merger risk. 
Categorizing Career and Whitman, we conclude, helped arbitrageurs interpret 
information that could have material implications for merger completion.  
 Arbitrageurs complement categorizations with analogies to past mergers.  At 
9:50 am, the conversation involved a discussion of another company in the for-profit 
education sector. “This guy Edison,” Max explained, “a few years ago wanted to 
manage the primary school system.  But then went down in flames.” The entrepreneur 
mentioned by Max was Christopher Whittle, founder of Edison Schools.  Edison 
began operations in 1995 with the promise to bring private-sector discipline to the 
bureaucratized education industry.  But the company saw its stock price plummet in 
2002 amidst accusations of corruption.  A scandal of the type that Edison experienced 
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would immediately ruin the merger at Career and Whitman, so the probability of a 
scandal had to be factored in.   
 Analogies, we conclude from our observations, help arbitrageurs anticipate 
possible merger obstacles. Like categories, analogies allow them to glean the future 
from the past. “We look for patterns,” Max explains, “precedent, similar deals, either 
hostile or friendly, degree of product overlap, and earnings variability.  We look at all 
the ways to slice the factors that weigh into the merger.” In the case of Career and 
Whitman, the analogy associated the two merging secondary-education firms with a 
another firm outside their industry, the for-profit primary education company, Edison 
Schools.  But the analogy to Edison, a firm previously marked by corruption, 
prompted a new concern: it led the arbitrageurs to focus on the honesty of the 
management teams at Career and Whitman. The flexible use of partly overlapping 
categories and analogies underscores that arbitrageurs do not just passively fit mergers 
into boxes.  
 The arbitrageurs also benefit from analogies with other deals in ways that are 
less obvious. Max recalls a merger between two junkyards that had incompatible 
databases. In the low-tech world of junkyards, one might not anticipate information 
technology to be a key factor in derailing a merger. But, Max added, “if the point of a 
junkyard is to find a door for that 1996 Volvo, you can imagine how important 
databases are. We had another deal with similar proprietary databases in a different 
industry [that] reminded me of that junkyard deal.” The arbitrageurs correctly 
predicted the failure of the merger between the junkyards and closed their positions 
early enough to avert any losses. As Max concludes, “drawing parallels and linkages 
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and saying ‘this reminds me of that’ is at the heart of what we do.” 
 The traders, however, do not just rely on their own memory to draw those 
associations. At 9:55 am Max called up a black-and-white window on his screen.  The 
screen displayed a set of old fashioned, 1980s-style Microsoft DOS characters.  
Pressing a combination of commands keys, Max obtained information on Edison to 
look for patterns that were similar to the Whitman-Career deal. The screen 
corresponded to a proprietary database that Max has meticulously assembled over the 
years, with information about all past mergers in which the desk has been involved, 
classified along numerous dimensions. This gives “thumbnail” information about each 
company that merged.  “You think you would remember,” Max says about it, “but you 
don’t.  Memory is very deceiving.” Like the other arbitrage artefacts presented above, 
the database contributes to distribute cognition at the trading desk. Specifically, by 
providing a costless system of storage and retrieval of past information, the database 
helped arbitrageurs mobilize past deals to make sense of current ones. 
 After two hours of establishing associations, the arbitrageurs were beginning to 
develop an overall impression of the Whitman-Career merger. Max explained,  
There may be many issues with this company, but I can invest right away by 
knowing that they’re a $5 million company and a $2 million company. This 
means it’s not one company acquiring another that’s the same size, which right 
away means that there are not financing issues involved. If there were, it would 
be a whole different game.    
 
As the quotation shows, Max was optimistic: even though the industry – for-profit 
education – was tainted by a past scandal, the traders were still encouraged by the lack 
of other obstacles.  
 At 10:15 am, the market opened on Whitman Education with a price of $13.95. 
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The arbitrageurs’ spreadsheets showed the spread to be a generous ten percent, 
signaling to the traders a potential opportunity. “I’d like to have a presence in the 
deal,” said Max almost immediately.  “Let’s bid $13.60 for 10,000” he added.  
Following the instruction, Anthony lifted the headset from his phone turret and called 
the block trader to place an order. Thus, barely two hours after starting to work on the 
deal, the merger traders at International Securities took a position in the Whitman-
Career merger.  
 Why take a position within minutes of the opening? Arbitrage, we observed, is 
a game of speed. The longer arbitrageurs take to adopt a position, the more time their 
competitors have to seize the opportunity before they do. As in Occam’s razor, 
arbitrageurs take into account as many factors as they need to take a position, but not 
more. Taking a position, then, involves a successive winnowing of the possible 
contingencies involved in the merger as the arbitrageurs think through the deal. The 
traders search through a form of mental decision tree in which each specific merger is 
considered in relation to similar deals that they encountered in the past. Max explains, 
“it’s almost like you’ve been in this road before and [the past incidents] direct you.” 
The advantage of this system, which Max describes as a “process-driven arbitrage,” is 
that numerous issues need not be taken into account. Arbitrage is fast, light, and 
deploys resources in a strategic manner. 
 The arbitrageurs, therefore, are not simply performing a routine task of 
recognition – classifying mergers into pre-existing categories – but a far more active 
task of re-cognition. That is, they are changing, expanding, and going beyond the 
existing categorical structure to ascertain the key merger obstacles in a given deal.  
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Representing the collective rival 
 
Our analysis so far has established that the arbitrageurs deploy sophisticated 
quantitative tools. But as we shall see, no matter how sophisticated their tools, 
arbitrageurs are acutely aware that their models are fallible. Traders confront their own 
fallibility by distancing themselves from the categories and procedures that guided 
them to an initial position. This, however, is easier said than done. Mental awareness 
of the limits of one’s view does not automatically provide a check against these limits. 
Traders, we found out, gain cognitive distance from their categories by exploiting the 
fact that other arbitrageurs have also taken positions on this trade. It is to the second 
moment of a distributed cognition – across a socio-technical network outside the 
trading room – that we turn. 
 At 10:30 am, the conversation between Max, Oswald, and Anthony shifted 
from Career and Whitman to another ongoing merger. Five months before our 
morning visit, Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank (HSBC) had announced its intention to 
acquire Household International, an American bank specialized in subprime 
mortgages. The traders at the merger desk had been “playing” this deal.  
 At 10:40 am Max typed a command in his Bloomberg terminal, producing a 
large black and blue graph on his screen. The chart, reproduced in Figure 1 below, 
displays the evolution of the “spread” between HSBC and Household. The spread is 
defined as the difference in the prices of the merging companies, adjusted for the terms 
of the merger. In this case the spread corresponded to the difference in the prices of 
HSBC and Household over the five-month period in which the merger unfolded, 
weighted by the stock conversion ratio agreed by the merging partners: 0.535 shares in 
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HSBC for each share in Household International.  
[Figure 1 here.] 
Visualizing merger likelihood. The graph, known as the “spreadplot,” plays a 
key role in the work of the traders. Movements in the spread signal changes in the 
likelihood of merger completion. If a merger is completed and the two merging firms 
become a single entity, the difference in their stock prices – the spread – will 
disappear. Thus, arbitrageurs interpret a narrowing of the spread as a sign that other 
arbitrageurs collectively assign a greater likelihood of merger completion. Conversely, 
if the merger is canceled and the equivalence between the two firms disappears, the 
spread will revert to its wider level before the merger announcement. Thus, 
arbitrageurs interpret a widening spread as a sign that other arbitrageurs collectively 
assign a lower likelihood of merger completion.  
 Using the spreadplot involves semiotic sophistication.  In this complex system 
of signs (Peirce 1998; Muniesa 2007), the spreadplot provides each trader an indirect 
sign of the likelihood of the merger, achieved by signaling the aggregate of his or her 
rivals’ assessment of that likelihood.  For the very reason that they are deeply 
proprietary, the trader does not have access to the proprietary databases through which 
particular other rivals constructed their own independent probability estimates.  And 
indeed, to have such access would result in cognitive overload: how could one gain 
cognitive distance from one’s own models if one had to engage in the time-consuming 
task of comparing them with those of dozens of other traders?  The spreadplot reduces 
that cognitive complexity by representing the aggregate of the expectations of other 
traders.  
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 The arbitrage trader, however, is not interested in the spreadplot as a sign of 
what others are doing in the market. They read the spread as a sign of an event that 
will or will not happen in the world – the merger.  The promising aspect of this sign is 
that it is quasi-independent of a trader’s own estimates of the probability of merger. 
The arbitrage trader is not a technical trader who, like the fashionista who monitors 
others to anticipate the hottest clubs, seeks to profit by anticipating market trends.  
Instead, arbitrageurs use the movements of their rivals as a check on their own 
independent opinion, rather than a substitute for it.  
 The HSBC-Household merger illustrates how the spreadplot helps traders 
identify potential obstacles to merger completion (see chart on Figure 1). The chart 
shows two clear spikes along a descending line. These correspond to instances in 
which market participants lost confidence in the merger. The first, on November 22, 
2002, was inspired by funding concerns: was HSBC a financially unsound company, 
simply buying Household to get funding? This surge in the spread subsided after a 
general market rally. The second spike took place on March 20, 2003, following news 
that Household International was shredding documents. This reminded arbitrageurs of 
similar shredding at Enron years before. The spread then fell again after the company 
received its approval from the financial authorities, and once HSBC reassured 
investors. The two spikes illustrate how plotting the spread brings into relief potential 
merger obstacles. Had the arbitrageurs not consulted the spread plot, these concerns 
might have remained unexplored -- an abandoned branch in the traders’ tree-like 
decision pattern. Checking the spreadplot, then, is a way to avoid cognitive lock-in 
(David 1985; Arthur 1989).  
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 Translating prices into probabilities. A key concept mobilized by the 
arbitrageurs is the “implied probability” of a merger. By implied, the arbitrageurs refer 
to the probability of merger completion that rival arbitrageurs assign to the merger. 
Quantifying this probability entails manipulating the basic regularity governing 
arbitrage, the Law of One Price, in a process known as “backing out.” Intellectually, 
backing out builds on the economic concept of “risk-neutral pricing.” The core idea 
behind this concept is that it is possible to extract useful information from mispricings 
in markets where arbitrageurs are present (Cox, Ross and Rubinstein 1979; Harrison 
and Kreps 1979). As the Law of One Price argues, the presence of arbitrageurs 
eliminates unjustifiable differences in prices across markets. (For instance, in the 
absence of transportation costs, the price of gold in London would not systematically 
differ from that of gold in New York without inviting the activity of arbitrageurs.) 
Once unjustifiable differences are arbitraged away, the difference in prices between 
New York and London that remain can be interpreted as the cost of transportation. 
Thus, by assuming that the Law of One Price applies, arbitrageurs can transform price 
differences into useful information. 
 Merger arbitrageurs apply this idea to corporate mergers. When a merger is 
announced and arbitrageurs are active on a stock, the stock price of the merger target 
should reflect the expected merger value. When the payment for the merger involves 
the stock of the acquirer, this merger value will itself be a function of the stock price 
of the acquirer. Thus, the difference in prices between the two stocks – the spread – 
can be read as a measure of the uncertainty that arbitrageurs assign to the merger.   
In this sense, backing out is an indirect form of observation, in which the focal 
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observer is looking at other observers.  Consider the decision to carry an umbrella to 
work.  Looking from one’s apartment window and seeing a mostly clear sky, one 
might decide it unnecessary to prepare for rain.  But if one glanced below and found 
pedestrians carrying umbrellas, one might be prompted to check, from another vantage 
point, for an impending storm.  Similarly, arbitrageurs check for unexpected merger 
obstacles by monitoring the aggregate actions of their rivals.  Dissonance can prompt 
doubt, stimulating additional search for what might have been missing in initial 
assessments.   
 Backing out probabilities, however, can only be done under certain conditions. 
In accomplishing the translation from prices to probabilities, arbitrageurs make two 
key assumptions: first, they assume that movements in the spread are dominated by 
merger considerations. Conversely, if the spread changed for some reason unrelated to 
the merger, the interpretation of the move as a change in merger likelihood would be 
erroneous. Second, the translation assumes that markets equilibrate rapidly (in the coin 
example, that the prices are “fair”). For that reason, unless rival arbitrageurs have seen 
the relevant prices, compared them to their own information and acted upon it, the 
spread will not convey their private knowledge. As we shall see, arbitrageurs are 
mindful of these two conditions and come back to them repeatedly whenever prices do 
not behave in an understandable manner.  
Gaining distance 
 “Are we missing something?” By 12:00 pm, the spread between Whitman and 
Career remained at the same wide margin it displayed two hours before, ten percent. 
Early on, a ten percent spread signaled an opportunity. But its persistence posed a 
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puzzle for the traders, for it could now be interpreted very differently. It could mean, 
first, that other professional arbitrageurs were not “playing” the deal because they 
perceived problems that could derail the merger. Alternatively, the wide spread could 
mean the reverse of a threat: a better-than-expected opportunity. “Can it be,” Max 
asked, “that the deal has gone under the radar screen of other traders?” The 
persistently wide spread, in short, was an ambiguous signal: it could be signaling 
incorrect modeling, or a profit opportunity. Establishing which of these applied was 
crucial to the traders. The spread, in other words, was a wake-up call that prompted 
arbitrageurs to think twice.   
 The conundrum faced by the traders is symptomatic of the disruptive role of 
the spreadplot. Arbitrageurs, the chart reminded them, should not blindly trust their 
probability estimates, because it hinges on a representation of the merger -- derived 
from the database -- that could be incorrect. The database could have inaccurate data, 
the wrong analogy, or a missing field. Given this, the spreadplot provides traders with 
a much-needed device for doubt: by displaying their degree of deviation from the 
consensus, the spreadplot provides arbitrageurs with timely red flags.  
 Responding to dissonance. Max and his colleagues responded to the discordant 
spread by plunging into a search for possible merger obstacles that they might not 
have anticipated. “Are we missing something,” Max asked the traders. The traders first 
turned to databases: at 12.10 pm, one of them typed the names “Whitman” and 
“Career” on an online proprietary database.  Like a Google keyword search, the 
database presented them with several hits ranked by relevance.  Skimming through the 
sources of each result, the trader was reassured to see familiar newspapers. The search, 
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then, did not produce anything they did not know in advance.   
 The database search is an instance of the way in which arbitrageurs respond to 
the discrepancy induced by the spreadplot. Having observed the dissonance between 
their own probability estimates and the implied probability, the traders went back to 
search for missing information. In doing this, the database helped even though the 
traders hardly knew what they were looking for: by including news from local media 
that the national media might have overlooked, it provided leads for issues that need to 
be dug deeper.  
The traders’ approach contrasts with early neo-institutionalist views of 
markets. In the classic account, the availability of social clues leads actors to 
economize on their search costs by imitating others (Meyer and Rowan 1978; 
DiMaggio and Powell 1983). In contrast, knowledge of the spread stimulated the 
arbitrageurs to search more. The discrepancy illustrates an important point about 
arbitrage. The material tools allow traders to come up with more sophisticated answers 
than traditional investors precisely by inducing skepticism about the tools. 
Arbitrageurs, in this sense, are persistent but skeptical users of calculative devices.  
 
 Recourse to the network. Following the inconclusive search on 
Whitman, the arbitrageurs got on the telephone. At 12:20 pm, Anthony lifted the 
headset of his phone turret and called the floor broker who handled orders for 
Whitman at the exchange.  “John says buy this WIX [for Whitman], no one’s really 
hedging it,” he said to Max as he finished the conversation.  No other arbitrageur, the 
floor broker implied, was active in the Whitman trade. From this, Max concluded that 
the merger had passed “under the radar screen” of other arbitrageurs.  He reacted by 
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increasing the desks’ exposure to the merger.  “Let’s work another ten [thousand], but 
pick your spots” he said to Anthony, asking the junior trader to purchase additional 
shares in Whitman, but to do so carefully to avoid inflating the stock price.   
 Why did the arbitrageurs call up their contacts? Until 12:00 pm, the traders had 
interpreted the spread as the implied probability of the merger. The persistent 
discrepancy between the wide spread and the traders’ estimates, however, created a 
dissonance that led them to question their own interpretation. Having re-checked the 
database, they decided to inquire about the identities of the shareholders, partially 
lifting the veil of anonymity that protects securities trading.  In doing so, the 
arbitrageurs were seeking to clarify whether backing out made sense in this context: 
was the spread reflecting the information in the hands of rival arbitrageurs? The 
traders concluded it was not. 
 The traders, however, were emphatically not mimicking their rivals.  Theirs 
was not a case of classic isomorphism or herding. Instead, they were attempting to 
disentangle overall market movements from the actions of the players who, in their 
view, were the only ones who really counted: their rivals, namely, other professional 
arbitrageurs.  On learning that no other real player was hedging the stock, they 
concluded that the spread could not be interpreted as a measure of implied probability.  
The red flag, on closer inspection, turned out to be a green light. Thus, reflexivity at 
the merger arbitrage desk cuts both ways: whereas an hour earlier the spreadplot had 
led Max and his team to raise doubts about their database, their subsequent phone 
conversation stimulated doubts about the meaning of the spreadplot, the device for 
doubt itself.     
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 In light of the above, consider now why Max told Anthony “pick your spots.”  
The expression reminded Anthony to cover his tracks as he increased the desks’ 
position on Whitman, with the aim of avoiding an increase in its stock price. The 
traders’ efforts suggest that Max and colleagues felt they were being observed by other 
arbitrageurs through the lens of the spread. Just as Max and his team engaged in a 
calculated game of guessing, so were rival arbitrageurs at other firms. Preserving an 
opportunity that had gone “under the radar screen” of rival traders required avoiding 
warning competitors.2 
 Reflexive modeling. The developments described above suggest that the 
traders’ caution unfolds as the confrontation between two related magnitudes. A 
trader’s ability to mobilize prices for greater precaution hinges on the encounter 
between the probability of the merger (estimated at the desk) and implied probability 
(derived from the spreadplot). This comparison provides an invaluable advantage: it 
signals to traders the extent of their deviation from the market, warns against missing 
information, motivates additional search, prompts them to activate their business 
contacts, and provides the necessary confidence to expand their positions.  
This distinctive interplay of internal and external estimates points to a novel 
use of economic models, which we refer to as reflexive modeling. The expression 
denotes the process whereby dispersed market actors employ economic models to 
confront their own estimates.  This confrontation pits a trader’s estimates against 
those of his or her rivals, thereby introducing dissonance in his or her calculations. 
This dissonance is attained through the construction of implied probability.  This 
                                                 
2 The merger was successfully completed on July 1st, 2003, and produced an annualized return of 
seventeen percent for Max and his team.  
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variable is a representation of an economic object that does not have a price, is 
otherwise not observable, and is co-produced by the positioning of actors who use it 
to confront their interpretations and re-evaluate their positions.  Collectively 
produced, the implied probability is a device for dissonance. Reflexive modeling 
thus denotes a heightened awareness on the part of the arbitrageurs about the limits 
of their own representations of the economy. The literature in the social studies of 
finance has already identified other instances of backing out. Thus, for example, 
options traders manipulate Black-Scholes to arrive at implied volatility (MacKenzie 
and Millo 2003).  And bond traders use implied interest rates (Zaloom 2009). In 
short, the use of models in reverse to develop estimates of market consensus is not 
specific to merger arbitrage.  
  From personal networks to financial models. The use of the spread is a telling 
sign of the calculative orientation of the arbitrageurs. Up until the late 1980s, merger 
arbitrageurs focused on anticipating the merger announcement by pursuing rumors 
from the networks of the traders. Currently, however, arbitrageurs center their bets on 
merger completion, which can be anticipated with the modeling tools described above, 
namely, the spreadplot and implied probability. Thus, whereas the typical strategies of 
investors traditionally entailed accessing information ahead of their competitors 
(Abolafia 1996), merger arbitrageurs base their advantage on financial models. These 
models have given arbitrageurs enough precision to access profit opportunities that did 
not exist before.  
 Max emphasized this important shift with an example. “Look at this jump,” he 
said, in reference to the brusque price movement of Household International on the 
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day its merger with HSBC was announced (see Figure 2 below). He added, 
This is the value that the [mutual] fund managers and the guys on the street are 
after. Once the jump has taken place, it’s a matter of pennies. The value 
investors don’t have the fine-tuned tools to position themselves in this spread, 
to determine if it’s too wide or too narrow for them. We do. 
 
Thus, the arbitrageurs eschew the fat margins that can be found by correctly 
anticipating the merger announcement, and only come into the trade once the deal is 
officially announced. The narrow margins to be obtained once the announcement is 
made are open to them, thanks to the precision of their quantitative techniques. Indeed, 
this shift in strategy was not only motivated by the availability of tools but also by the 
dangers involved in relying on rumors and privileged information. The indictment of 
merger arbitrageur Ivan Boesky in 1986 on charges of insider trading discouraged the 
rest of the arbitrage community from exploiting privileged information about 
unannounced mergers.  
[Insert Figure 2 about here] 
In line with this long-running shift from rumors to models, the traders have 
come to see nuanced interpretation, rather than raw information, as the source of their 
advantage. When asked about the reason for the disparity between their own 
assessment of merger probability and the merger spread, Max argued that it stemmed 
from a differential interpretation of the data.  Max said, 
The reason why the spread is large is that other traders have their own 
proprietary models for it.  And they can all be right.  At this point, it’s all about 
the future, and we don’t know the future.  So their assumptions on volatility, 
for example, could be different than ours. Or their assumptions about timing. 
   
The opportunity that Max saw, then, was not the result of privileged information. As 
Max said, “right now, the data is all on the Internet, even the SEC filings.” Being 
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widely available, information does not confer any advantage. To him, it resulted from 
his desks’ distinct interpretation of publicly available data.  
 Our account so far presents the bright side of financial models. Thanks to 
reflexive modeling, arbitrageurs have increased the accuracy of their estimates, 
gaining access to new opportunities while reducing their risk. As we shall see, 
however, there is also a downside to financial modeling. Because arbitrageurs use 
models to check their positions against the rest of the market, the diffusion of reflexive 
modeling creates cognitive interdependence between otherwise independent rivals.  
 
RESONANCE AND COLLECTIVE FAILURE IN A MERGER ARBITRAGE TRADE 
Precisely because of its cognitive benefits, reflexive modeling poses an important 
danger, as this practice can produce collective failure. This problem became clear to us 
when analyzing one concrete case. On June 12, 2001 the European Commission stated 
a firm opposition to the planned merger between two large American companies.  The 
ruling put an end to the proposed combination between General Electric and 
Honeywell International, announced seven months before.  As news of the ruling 
arrived on Wall Street, Honeywell’s stock price fell by more than ten percent. The 
drop caused losses of more than $2.8 billion to professional arbitrageurs -- the hedge 
funds and investment banks that expected the merger to succeed. The magnitude of the 
losses was eloquently captured by the words of a Wall Street executive to the Wall 
Street Journal. "Obviously this has been very painful,” he noted. “The losses are going 
to be very big,” he added (Sidel 2001: C1). 
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Events like the GE-Honeywell merger failure have received increasing 
attention in the finance literature, and are known as “arbitrage disasters.” An arbitrage 
disaster denotes a merger that is cancelled after being announced, leading to 
widespread losses for the arbitrageurs that bet on it. Importantly, not all merger 
cancellations are disasters – only those that have a damaging impact on the aggregate 
returns of arbitrageurs. Merger cancellations that are widely anticipated are thus not 
disasters. Indeed, only fifteen merger cancellations between 1984 and 2004 can be 
classified as disasters (Officer 2007). The GE-Honeywell merger failure was the worst 
accident in that period. Another important disaster was the cancelled merger between 
Tellabs and Ciena in 1998, which imposed a loss of $181 million on Long-Term 
Capital and contributed to the downfall of the fund.  
[Table 1 and Figure 3 about here.] 
Understanding arbitrage disasters can shed light on the risks posed by 
quantitative finance.  These crises could be seen as a direct outcome of information 
cascades.  After all, the losses imposed by these blowups are typically experienced 
simultaneously by almost all arbitrage funds active in the failed deal.  In what appears 
to be a classic case of lemming-like march towards the cliff, when disasters happen 
they tend to affect most desks in the industry.  Arbitrage disasters could thus appear to 
be the outcome of imitation, herding or information cascades.  
Arbitrage disasters can also be seen as Black Swans. These adverse events are 
typically associated with the presence of surprise: arbitrageurs suffer losses when two 
companies cancel a merger that the traders believed would happen. And indeed, the 
history of GE-Honeywell is in many ways the history of a painful surprise -- 
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arbitrageurs did not sufficiently anticipate the danger of regulatory opposition to the 
merger.  The merger traders had a reason to ignore it, as the antitrust authorities in the 
United States and Europe had always coordinated their rulings. Never before had a 
merger authorized in Washington been blocked in Brussels (Bary 2001: 43). This 
precedent was broken in the GE-Honeywell deal. Its leading protagonist, the famously 
rigorous European commissioner Mario Monti, called for a cancellation of the merger 
on the grounds that it would give the combined entity an ability to engage in anti-
competitive “bundling.”  Given this unexpected cancellation, the disaster could be 
seen as a Black Swan.  
Our analysis, however, suggests that GE-Honeywell was neither a Black Swan 
nor an information cascade. It was, we contend, an unintended consequence of 
reflexive modeling. To see how arbitrageurs thought about the GE-Honeywell deal, 
consider the spread between GE-Honeywell, as shown in Figure 4. As the narrow 
spread shows, arbitrageurs initially assigned a very large implied probability to the 
completion of the merger.  Reports from the financial press confirm this point.  As one 
arbitrageur put it to the financial press, “people had it among their larger positions 
because they thought there was a large probability the deal would get done" (Sidel 
2001: C1). 
[Figure 4 about here.] 
 Such high confidence had a legitimate cause. It was a direct consequence of the 
decision, taken by numerous arbitrage funds, not to give material weight to the danger 
of European regulatory opposition. This can be deduced from a comparison between 
the merger spreadplot and the media responses to the Commission’s actions (see 
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Figure 4). The bar chart in the figure shows the number of weekly articles published in 
the major business press that included in their text the words “Honeywell” and 
“Monti.” These include publications such as The Wall Street Journal, The Financial 
Times, The Economist, etc. The spike in the number of articles on February 27th 2001 
shows that the media had genuine concern about European opposition. But even as it 
voiced these concerns, the narrow spread between the merging companies barely 
inched. The implication is that the arbitrage community did not share that concern.  In 
short, the traders’ models did not seem to be picking up the danger of European 
regulatory opposition.  
 But this was not a simple story of omitted variables either.  Our interviews 
suggest that the size and magnitude of the disaster was an outcome of a subsequent 
move: the traders’ reaction to the initial confidence.  It was the social activity, coupled 
to the model, that produced such losses. As it turns out, International Securities was 
active in the GE-Honeywell deal, and lost six million dollars on it. To clarify the 
precise mechanism that led to these losses, we interviewed the senior merger trader 
and the manager of the trading room. The latter made clear that the bank was reacting 
to the spreadplot. It increased its position, making things worse for itself. According to 
the manger of the trading room,  
Max traded it … everyone’s database lacked a field, and the field was 
“European regulatory denial.” … I encouraged him [Max] to increase his size 
… you have confidence, all of your fields are fine… so instead of four million, 
I said six million. 
  
 
In other words, the desk lost six million because it increased its exposure to the trade, 
and the increased exposure was a reaction to the spreadplot.  
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 We checked our explanation of the disaster by asking Max directly. His reply 
encompassed reflexive modeling, arbitrage disasters and (crucially) the relationship 
between the two. First, Max agreed that he used backed-out probabilities to see 
mistakes. To him, the implied probability,  
Is a reality check. It’s a number that’s out there and it challenges everyday when 
you come in to have 85 percent confidence in this deal, whatever that is. You 
could have a little sign saying, “Are you challenging yourself in every day on 
every deal?” 
 
Thus, in other words, Max agreed that he engaged in reflexive modeling.  
Second, Max agreed with our explanation of the GE-Honeywell disaster. 
Arbitrageurs, he explained, were initially mistaken in their confidence on the GE- 
Honeywell merger. Max even generalized the case to others in a way that is consistent 
with our view: “disasters,” he said, “happen when there is a [mistaken] first impression 
and people don’t have a basis for handicapping it properly.” And in the GE- 
Honeywell case, Max concurred that inability to handicap resulted from the lack of 
precedent: “it was really the novelty.” Finally, Max agreed that reflexive modeling 
affects prices in a way that could lead to disasters. “It’s an interesting feedback loop,” 
Max said about implied probability, “[Prices] are both cause and effect of market 
confidence.” In short, we find confirmation in Max’s response. He engaged in 
reflexive modeling, arbitrageurs were initially mistaken about GE- Honeywell, and 
noted that this practice has a subsequent effect on confidence. 
 Resonance. In sum, our examination of the failed GE-Honeywell merger points 
to a socio-technical mechanism of representation and calculated reaction. The losses at 
International Securities stemmed from a three-stage process. First, the arbitrageurs at 
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International Securities independently underestimated the risk of regulatory opposition 
(their competitors did too).  Second, when the arbitrageurs checked the spreadplot to 
confront their estimates against the rest of the market, they found confirmation: the 
spread was narrow, and was not moving with news of Monti.  Thus reinforced, the 
traders then engaged in a third move: they increased their exposure.  The combined 
result of these three steps is that the overconfidence of the different arbitrage funds 
reinforced each other, via the spreadplot. The spreadplot is thus the source of cognitive 
interdependence. Were it not for this device and the practice of reflexive modeling, 
trading losses would have been far less profound and widespread.  
In our interviews, the traders confirmed that arbitrage disasters are caused by 
the use of the spreadplot. Disasters start when numerous arbitrage funds overlook a 
potential cause of merger failure. Or as Max puts it, “when there is a first impression 
and people don’t have a basis for handicapping it properly.” This initial oversight is 
then compounded by the fact that each fund erroneously takes the others’ lack of 
visible concern (i.e., the absence of a spike the spreadplot) as reassurance that the 
merger will be completed. The added confidence leads each fund to increase its 
position, compounding the losses when the merger is canceled.  
Reflexive modeling amplifies individual errors when a sufficiently large 
number of arbitrage funds have a similar model.3 Whereas reflexive modeling 
improves trading on the basis of dissonance, it can lead to financial disaster in the 
presence of resonance.  Such resonance takes place when the combined use of models 
and stock prices gives traders misplaced confidence on an event. Resonance, we argue, 
                                                 
3 Khandani and Lo (2007) explain the crisis of August 2007 in the similarity in strategy across hedge 
funds.  
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is cause of the GE-Honeywell arbitrage disaster. It is caused by the lack of diversity in 
the models and databases of the actors engaged in a deal coupled with the availability 
of tools such as the spreadplot that allow each arbitrageur to read the rest.  
 Exploiting resonance. One sign that resonance is an acute problem in 
merger arbitrage is the existence of funds that set out to exploit it. According to the 
Financial Times, the New York hedge fund Atticus Global has developed a strategy 
to exploit arbitrage disasters such as the GE-Honeywell deal (Clow 2001). Atticus 
bet against mergers when other arbitrageurs were most confident in them. 
According to Clow (2001: 25), “Most risk arbitrage managers followed their usual 
strategy of going long the target, Honeywell, and short the buyer, GE. Atticus 
shorted Honeywell and bought GE, making a 10 per cent return on its investment.” 
  
COGNITIVE INTERDEPENDENCE IN QUANTITATIVE FINANCE 
Our analysis sheds light on the socio-technical nature of quantitative finance. 
Understanding the full implications of the quantitative revolution, we found, calls for 
an appreciation of both social and technological aspects of markets – in short, of the 
cognitive interdependence introduced by financial models. The mechanism of 
resonance proposed above posits a form of interdependence that results from the 
traders’ use of models for reflexive purposes.  
A socio-technical account of reflexivity   
The reflexivity exhibited by the traders is not a mental process or a solipsistic 
practice. In its simplest form, reflexivity rests on the contraposition of two material 
artifacts – the arbitrageur’s screens. The first, an Excel spreadsheet, summarizes how 
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the traders think about the merger. The so-called Trading Summary builds on a web of 
associations, including categories and analogies, leading up to the key issue facing the 
deal.  The second screen, the spreadplot, is shared by all arbitrage funds and captures 
how competitors think about the merger by showing the difference in the prices 
between the merging companies. Reflexivity is made possible by the friction between 
the two screens. Friction offers cues that the arbitrageurs might be missing a relevant 
obstacle to the merger. Instead of substituting search with imitation, as in mimetic 
isomorphism, arbitrageurs use social cues to complement their search.  
As a practice of using a model to gain cognitive distance, reflexive modeling is 
thus a cognitive process.  But it is not taking place in the heads of the traders, as if 
cognition could be turned back onto itself.  Just as the cognitive process of deriving 
their own probability estimates is socially distributed across the tools and instruments 
at the arbitrage desk, so reflexive cognition (Stark 2009) is a socio-technical process of 
distributed cognition triggered by the spreadplot – a device for dissonance that is itself 
a socio-technically constructed object. The traders we observed were not engaging in 
some heroic mental feat, splitting and twisting their minds back on themselves like 
some intellectual variant of a flexible contortionist.  Instead, as we saw numerous 
times in a single morning at a single trading desk, the taken-for-granteds of their 
models were cognitively disrupted by devices for dissonance.  
The notion of reflexive modeling advances the concept of scopic markets by 
Knorr-Cetina (2005). In reflexive modeling, the model itself is used for scopic 
purposes. But instead of scoping the intrinsic qualities of the economic object – the 
profitability, solvency or merger likelihood of a publicly listed company – it focuses 
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instead on the behavior of other actors in the market. As a result, traders escape the 
impossible choice between models or social cues because the model constitutes the 
lens through which the social cues are revealed. Indeed, models even go beyond 
displaying social cues, quantifying them and translating the resulting number into one 
that is commensurate with the likelihood estimates of the merger traders.  
Reflexive modeling thus brings quantitative finance into full circle: whereas 
the introduction of models and information technology in the capital markets brought 
in anonymity and a semblance of objectivity in the data, reflexive modeling makes it 
clear that traders are not just modeling the economic but also the social properties of 
the market. Although anonymous and impersonal, quantitative finance brings back the 
interdependence among the actors – and for that reason, its social aspect. This form of 
sociability around models does not easily fit existing frameworks in economic 
sociology – it is dissembedded yet entangled; anonymous yet collective; impersonal 
yet, nevertheless, emphatically social. 
 
A socio-technical account of risk 
Just as reflexive modeling can be a source of correction, it can also lead to the 
amplification of error. When this takes place, financial actors confront a situation of 
resonance. The concept of resonance contributes to economic sociology by 
complementing existing behavioral accounts of risk such as herding and the Black 
Swan. Resonance explains arbitrage disasters without the need to resort to individual 
biases. Instead, it explains them as the unintended consequence of a mostly functional 
system. 
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 Given this, does quantitative finance add or reduce the risk faced by market 
participants? We see this as a false dichotomy. As Luhmann and other sociologists of 
risk have argued, risk is rarely eliminated in modern technological societies (Luhmann 
1993, Beck 1992, Giddens 1990).  Given the limits of human knowledge in a modern 
economy, new technologies carry with them an irreducible degree of uncertainty.  
Efforts to mitigate risk, whether through such technologies or new organizational 
arrangements, can give rise to unintended consequences in the form of second-order 
dangers. Resonance can be seen as an unintended consequence of risk mitigation. Our 
study thus extends the work of Holzer and Millo (2005) on market crises such as the 
implosion of Long Term Capital in 1998 or the role of program trading during the 
1987 market crash. In both cases, as in ours, the unintended consequences of risk 
mitigation arise from feedback effects that come into play once an innovation in 
quantitative finance is widely adopted.  
 
CONCLUSION 
Our study explores a distinct form of risk posed by financial models. It 
examines the risks posed by using financial models for the purpose of backing out: 
that is, using models to understand the views held by rival traders. The study compares 
two distinct moments in merger arbitrage within the same equity derivatives trading 
room.  The first episode took place on the morning of March 27, 2003. Two education 
companies announced their intention to merge. Their merger allowed us to see how 
traders engaged in reflexive modeling, using the implied probability to ponder and 
reflect upon their own probability estimates. The second episode in our investigation 
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took us back to the year 2001. Almost all merger arbitrageurs on Wall Street were 
persuaded of the certainty of the merger between GE and Honeywell. But the merger 
unraveled. The cancellation of the deal led to a veritable red-colored oil spill of losses 
across hedge funds and investment banks, totaling almost three billion dollars.  
The central contention of our analysis is that these first and second episodes are 
conceptually related.  The cause of the GE-Honeywell arbitrage disaster, we 
concluded, was a malfunctioning of the same reflexive mechanism that we observed in 
the merger of the education companies.  Reflexive modeling works by providing 
traders with dissonance whenever their estimates are different from those of the 
majority – and therefore, possibly mistaken.  But if enough traders miss a key variable, 
their mistake will reverberate to the others through the implied probability.  As 
resonance develops in the system, traders gain a false confidence that their views are 
correct, suffering extraordinary losses in the event of merger cancellation.   
Unlike existing research, the notion of resonance reflexive modeling engages 
with quantitative finance by taking both social and technological factors into account. 
Resonance is additionally appealing in that it does not require the assumption of 
individual biases on the part of financial actors, whether it is unreflexiveness or a 
tendency to conform.  On the contrary, our account is compatible with a view of 
individual actors as intelligent, creative, thoughtful, and independently minded.  In 
doing so, it brings out into sharper relief the dilemma involved in the social use of 
financial models: their use can ameliorate financial risks, but it increase the potential 
of even greater dangers.  
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Appendix A: Backing out implied merger probability from stock prices. 
A formal approach. 
 
The implied probability of a merger can be derived form the merger spread. The 
method is based on the classical results of the Arrow-Debreu theory of contingent 
claims, and the probabilities that are derived are known as risk neutral probabilities. 
Here we follow the notation of Vidyamurthy (2004: 177). See Jarrow and Turnbull 
(2000) for an expanded treatment. 
 
According to Arrow-Debreu, any two bets with the same expected payoff have the 
same current value. Denote by S0 the merger spread at time zero. Upon the 
successful completion of the deal, the spread will converge to zero. A long position 
in the merger target is reversed at no additional cost at time T, and the reward 
earned by the investor will be erTS0, with r being the interest rate. If there is cash 
paid out as well, the payoff will be erTS0+ cash. If, on the other hand, the deal ends 
up in failure, the spread will not converge to zero, but will rise to a value of ST. The 
net payoff will then be erTS0-ST.  
 
By the no arbitrage condition, the expected payoff is zero. Writing out the 
equations, we have: 
 
πsuccess (erTS0 + cash) + πfailure(erTS0 – ST) = 0    [1] 
 
πsuccess + πfailure = 1       [2] 
 
Solving the two equations, we have: 
 
 
π failure =
erT (S0 + e
−rTcash)
ST + cash
                [3] 
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Table 1.  Arbitrage disasters, 1990-2003. 
 
Acquirer    
                                 
Target Cancelation 
date 
Percentage 
holding by 
arbitrageurs 
 
Implied total 
losses, 
$000s 
 
General Electric Co 
 
Honeywell International Inc  
 
10/2/2001 53 2,798,376 
American Home 
Products Co     
 
Monsanto Co 10/13/1998 45  2,335,367 
 
British Telecommu-
nications PLC   
   
MCI Communications  
 
11/10/1997 40  1,908,240 
 Tellabs Inc  
 
CIENA Co 9/14/1998 34 1,179,412 
 
Investor Group     
 
AMR Co 10/16/1989 36 712,042 
 
Staples Inc Inc      
 
Office Depot 7/2/1997 44 558,804 
 
Investor Group   
   
UAL Co 10/18/1989 29 542,058 
 
Abbott Laboratories 
     
ALZA Co 12/16/1999 46 525,194 
 
Tracinda Corp  
    
Chrysler Co 5/31/1995 42 458,918 
 
Revlon Group     
 
Gillette Co 
 
11/24/1986 25 286,371 
 
Mattel Inc     
 
Hasbro Inc 
 
 
2/2/1996 228 228,557 
 
McCaw Cellular 
Communications    
  
LIN Broadcasting 10/10/1989 50 219,937 
 
Amway Co     
 
Avon Products Inc 
 
5/18/1989 29 165,816 
 
Investor Group   
 
Goodyear Tire & Rubber 11/20/1986 25 145,344 
 
 
This table contains details of the fifteen largest merger arbitrage disasters from 1985 to 2004. All 
dollar arbitrage losses are in 2004 dollars. Arbitrageurs’ percentage holding is the percent of target 
shares outstanding reported as owned by arbitrageurs at the first quarterly 13F reporting date after 
the bid announcement date. Implied dollar arbitrage loss is the total arbitrage loss multiplied by 
arbitrageurs’ percentage. Source: Officer (2007). 
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Figure 1. Charting the implicit probability of merger. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Screen shot of a Bloomberg terminal showing the spreadplot of Household International and HSBC 
Bank, November 2002 to May 2004.  Source: International Securities. 
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Figure 2. The jump in the spread on merger announcement date. 
 
 
 
Spreadplot of Household International and HSBC Bank, before and after the merger announcement. 
The jump in the spread on November 2002, corresponds to the merger announcement. Contemporary 
arbitrageurs, however, focus their trading on the post-announcement period. Source: Bloomberg. 
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Figure 3.  Merger arbitrage disasters 
 
 
 
 
Failed arbitrage deals, with total losses incurred by arbitrageurs (circle size) and relative participation of 
arbitrageurs in (y-axis). Source: Officer 2007: 27. 
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Figure 4: Arbitrageurs overlooked the danger of European opposition. 
 
 
 
 
Spread between GE and Honeywell (line) and media concern over EC opposition to the merger 
(bar). The graph shows that the surge in media concern in late February was not matched by a 
corresponding increase in the merger spread. Source: Bloomberg and ABI/Inform 
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